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H – 656

International Court of Justice

H0656 - 0002

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Nicht zu veroeffentlichen vor Darlegung vor dem Gericht (Tribunal) in oeffentlicher Sitzung und dann nur jenen Teil, welcher tatsaechlich zur Beweisfuehrung uebermittelt wurde.

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I certify that none of the documents included herein have been denied by the tribunal and that this document book has been examined with the prosecution in accordance with the ruling of the tribunal dated 4 April 1946.

Je certifie qu'aucun des documents ci-inclus n'a été contesté par le Tribunal, et que ce livre de documents a été examiné par le Ministère Public suivant les règles du Tribunal, en date du 4 Avril 1946,

Ich bestaetige , dass keine der hierin enthaltenen Dokumente vom Gerichtshof abgelehnt wurden und dass dieses Dokumentenbuch gemeinsam mit der Anklagevertretung durchgesehen wurde, in Uebereinstimmung mit der Entscheidung des Gerichtshofes vom 4. April 1946.

Signature of Counsel

Signature de l'Avocat

Unterschrift des Verteidigers.

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D O C U M E N T B O O K I

Of the Counsel for the defense

of Defendant Grandadmiral Karl D ö n i t z

submitted

by the councel for the defense.

H0656 - 0005

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Defense of Grand Admiral Doenitz

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Filed May 7, 1946

Doenitz 1

E X T R A C T

from the

War-Diary of the Naval War Command 1939

(KTB Skl Part A Aug.Sept. 1939)

15.8. Prepared (for case Weiss) the following measures:
from 15.8. Spee and all atlantic-submarines ready to sail
22.8. Transport (Trosschiff) Westerwald ready to sail
25.8. Deutschland ready to sail.
(.....arrays.....)

21.8. Report B service about tension measures French fleet

23.8. Report B service: Continuation of French tension measures of fleet to 3rd grade. English and French blockade measures off ports.

25.8. B service reports: German and Italian steamers are watched and reported through France.

31.8. Arrival Order I of OKW for waging the war: Forceful solution in the East, attack against Poland 1 Sept. 0445 o'clock. At West responsibility for starting hostilities unequivocally to be left to England and France. Respect strictly neutrality of Holland, Belgium, Luxemburg, Switzerland. No hostile actions or such that could be interpreted as hostile. Luftwaffe only in defense.
In case of opening of hostilities by western powers: Defense only at the same time sparing of forces. Reserve beginning of attack-activities. The army holds the "Westwall". Naval Commercial War with center of gravity against England. To augment the effect one may count on declaration of zones of danger. Prepare these and present them. The Baltic to be safe-guarded against enemy invasion.

(KTB Skl Part C, folder (Heft) VIII 1939)

31.8. France denounces agreement 2 of Hague Conference of 18 October 1907 concerning enemy merchant ships when was has begun effective 13 July 40.

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Exhibit May 7, 1946

Extract

from

Wardiary of Chief of Submarines West 1939.

(K T B F dU West Sept. 1939)

1 Sept.39 Inquiry from group West, whether German sub still present in the Jade area as electro-motor noises are heard at Wangerooge. As "U 20" left W - haven at 0015 o'clock it must have left the Jade area about 2½ hours ago; besides with Diesels (submersion prohibited.)

4 Sept.39
1400 h Several reports have arrived concerning English submarines seen in Helgoland bay confirming use of boats in this part of the sea.

6 Sept.39
0,30 U 24 reports an English sub near Westerems.

0600 U 58 reports with "Radio Telegram" 0440 an Englisn sub in QU 3445

H0656 - 0015

Ident May 7, 1946

Doenitz 3

Extract

from

War Diary of Chief of Submarines 1939.

(KTB BdU 1-15.9.1939.)

3.11.39. The Navalwarcommand asks the Chief's of submarines opinion concerning the possibility of submarines attacks on the still existing import of wood in to England from North Russian ports.

I had already planned the use of U 36 in the area East of the North cape though the expectations of success in that area seem to be entirely favorable, I believe I cannot make further decisions till this enterprise has cleared up the actual situation. At the same time Naval Warfare Command (Skl.) reports that there are possibilities for the establishment of a "Base North" which seem to be very promising. In my opinion the immediate beginning of all possible efforts to arrive at a clear judgment of the existing possibilities is of the greatest importance. The advantages of a base in the North are:

1. The very decidedly more advantageous position for attacks against the merchantroad Northrussia--England,
2. The safer route of approach; it leads well free from England through deep water. (Use of Denmark Straits is possible with hardly a detour.)

As disadvantages are to be considered:

1. The lengthening of the way of approach by further 300 nautical miles.
2. The lack of proper opportunities for docking and repairing. The difficulty of supplementing materials by way of the land route.

As long as crossing the North Sea is not connected with too great a danger or loss of time a base in the North is only of importance for the attacks against wood-transports from the Northrussian ports.

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But if one day the disadvantage of the longer way of approach were balanced by the danger in crossing the North Sea, becoming more serious, the Base North would become most important. It is not easy to predict how long the woodtransports will continue, but the supposition is justifiable, that they will either stop soon anyhow or that the political suppositions for this base will disappear.

Therefore: if the political situation is such that it is purposeful to build this base, it must be built large enough to comply with large demands. In that case it will be expedient to make it as movable as possible taking into account that it should be possible to move it further West in order to meet a changed situation in this war.

A safe radio communication must be established between base and ships and the home-country. As one cannot rely on the secret of a larger enterprise being kept for long, military meassures of protection must be installed from the first so as to prevent surprise coups of the enemy.

A proposal based on these reflections was sent to the Naval war command.

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Filed May 7, 1946

Doenitz 4

E X T R A C T

from

War-Diary of the Naval War Command 1939

(KTB Skl, Part A. November 1939)

17.11.39.....

F.O Submarines receives orders from Naval War Command concerning trying out Base North. The naval war command considers the trying out of the base by "U 36" due to sail within the next days for highly desirable. Supply goods for tanker "Phoenizia" in Murmansk leaving with fishing steamer to Murmansk on 22 Nov.

H0656 – 0018

Doc. C 66- GB 81-

Memorandum Greatadmiral Raeder to Admiral Assmann:

Chief - Affair!

(Extract)

.....

b) Weser-exercise.

I had an exchange of letters with Admiral Carls during the weeks before the report on 10-10-39, in which he first in an explicit letter, adressed to me, stressed the importance of an occupation of the Norwegian coast by Germany.....

Report to the Fuehrer, which I held on 10-10-39.

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 Rejected

Doenitz 5

E x c e r p t

from

Documents of German Politics, Volume 8, Part 1

5. Statement of the Reich Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop before the representatives of the foreign press at the federal council hall of the Foreign Office on the morning of 9 April 1940.

.....

page 35:

.....

For some time the Reich government had word, that in the entire zone of Norway, English and French officers of the General- and Admiral staff are present for reconnoitring and preparing landing places and planning the march to the South. 1).

.....

Footnote: 1)
As early as 29 December 1939, the British admiralty requested from the British consul at Narvik detailed data about the port of Narvik and the two airports near Tromsoe and Narvik; on 3 January 1940 details about the power supply of Narvik; the answers were given on 2 and 4 January. Besides, the consul at Narvik reported on 13 January about Norwegian troop movements. Furthermore, on 31 January the director of the Navy Intelligence Division of the British admiralty sent a long and very detailed questionnaire about the conditions in that port (plans, expansion, unloading and repair facilities, coal supplies, oil supplies, means of communication, defense installation coastal conditions, etc.) to the leading shipping control official at Narvik. The French Navy Attaché reported in February about facilities for unloading troops and about transport possibilities in Norway, as well as the conditions of the ports of Drontheim and vicinity, all according to a questionnaire of 29 January.

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Filed -8- May 8

Doenitz 6

EXCERPT

from

War Diary of the Commander in Chief of U boats 1940

(KTB BdU March 1940 Appendix "Weseruebung")

5 March 1940 The Commander of U-Boats participates in a conference with the Chief of Staff of the naval command.

Contents of the conference:

Preparation of the occupation of Norway and Denmark by the German Wehrmacht.

Remark of the copyist: (This is followed by details about the different tasks of the commanders and the forces under them.)

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Doenitz 7

REICH GAZETTE

1910

Page 283

(No 3711) Agreement concerning application of the principle of the Geneva convention to sea-warfare. Dated 18 October 1907.

.....

Article 16:

After every fight both belligerent parties shall make arrangements, as far as military operations permit, to search for shipwrecked, wounded and sick people and to protect them, just as the dead, against robbery and bad treatment. They shall watch that the burial on land or sea, or the cremating of the dead is preceded by a careful inquest.

.....

Article 18:

The stipulations of this convention are only valid between the contracting powers and only if all belligerents are parties to the agreement.

.....

Field Mss 11

Doenitz 8

Excerpt

from

War Diary of the Commander in Chief of the U boats 1939

(KTB BdU 1.-15 October 1939)

4 October 1939 Regarding the conduct of the war against commerce, the following orders are received by the sea-warfare command:

1) The territory in which blacked out ships may be attacked is enlarged to the West up to 15 degrees western longitude.

2) U boats may attack at once enemy merchant vessels on which armament is recognized without doubt, respectively the armament of which is announced by the sea-warfare command on the basis of unobjectionable evidence. As far as circumstances permit, measures shall be taken for the rescue of the crew, if the possibility of endangering the U boat is excluded. Passenger steamers that are not used for troop transports shall not be attacked now as in the past, even when they are armed.

Both orders mean a considerable progress for the conduct of the war. They favor the nature of the U-boat attack and increase its prospects.

. . . . . .

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Filed May 11, 1946

Doenitz 9

EXTRACT

from

War Diary of the Sea-Warfare Command 1939

(KTB Skl Part C, Volume VIII, 1939)

26 Sept. 1939 Havas reports that the crew of the British steamer "Royal Sceptre", sunk by a German U boat, was lost.

Foreign Office (A.A.) is notified that the U boat concerned transferred the crew of the "Royal Sceptre" to the British steamer "Browning", which for this reason was permitted to get away.

EXTRACT

from

War Diary of the Commander in Chief of the U boats 1939

(KTB BdU 1 - 15 October 1939)

30 Oct. 1939 Several B reports indicate the sinking of the Greek steamer "Diamandis" near the Western mouth of the Channel. This is confirmed by a wireless (FT) from U 35 which reports that she has the entire crew of the sunken steamer on board, safe and sound. The wireless was sent presumably because the commander believed that he had to contradict other reports.

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Fld May 11, 1946

Doenitz 10

Excerpt from:
War Diary of the submarine U-41
(KTB U-41 November 1939)

---

12 November 1939
0700

Fishing steamer ahead. Stopped with artillery. No doubt, English fishing steamer. With Morse lamp ordered into the boats. Boats are lowered. On account of possible U boat trap shelled with cannon at distance of 2500 meters, 35 shots. Observed 2 hits. Strong ground swell. Since steamer does not sink, submerged, inspected at closer range. Appears not dangerous. Has hoisted white flag, is steamer 129 Cresswell 275 tons. Emerged, saw several men swimming in the water, among them several on a raft. First saved those swimming in the ice cold water. Saved seven men, among them the captain, another man is being taken on board. Attempts of revival are in vain. Thrown overboard again. Have not seen more of the crew of 13. Boat was damaged and capsized when lowered. Water temperature 12 degrees (Celsius). Steamer sank during life saving's maneuver on account of hits.
0800 Qu 3570 AM

.....

1642

Recognized English fishing steamer F.D. 144. Consider it more advisable to give up the 7 prisoners than to sink the ship.

Since other communication is not possible, order the lowering of the boat by megaphone. In spite of enormous groun swell and heavy seas the 7 prisoners are transferred in 2 turns, after proposing 3 hurras for our boat. Fish steamer is released after net is cut loose. Continue on course 235 degrees.

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H0656 – 0025

Read May 9

D 642-GB 196

Secret!

Standing War Order No.154
Tactical directives.

1.) while marching.

To exercise suspicion and caution during marches, while no fighting is taking place. Continuous sharp lookout, also for fliers in every location on sea.

2.) Prior to attack.

a) premeditated advancing, when object of attack is given, with iron will carrying through the attack to final destruction. During attack situations often arise, which would justify abandoning the attack. Such moments or moods must be overcome.

b) never to deceive oneself: I don't attack now or I am not firm enough in the attack, because I hope to find something later elsewhere. What one has, one has. Do not try to save fuel for such reasons.

c) In Sea-warfare according to Prize-laws, caution while stopping. Maintain long distance from ship, proceed within submarine, sharp look out for periscopes, horizo. and sky. Observe ship constantly through specially distributed lookout posts. Sinking through underwater-. torpedo after stopping during daytime. To approach ship only under water, since area surrounding ship is dangerous. Many submarine traps hope for this.

d) In firing of the torpedo it must be attempted, by day and night, to calmly grasp all the details necessary for proper firing. To arrive and immediately start shooting in all directions will yield no results. Generally speaking, during war, one is always further away from an object than one thought to be, especially at night. Therefore up and at 'em! Close firing distance is the best security for the boat.

No depth charges are being dropped by the convoy in the proximity of enemy ships. Should one fire into a convoy from close quarters and then be compelled to submerge, one could always lose oneself among other ships of the convoy and thus remain safe from depth charges.

Most misses during the night are based on the fact, that the firing took place from too sternward a position.

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The situation at night is considered smaller than it actually is, since the forward position appears dangerous and unsympathetic during a possible change of course of the steamer. However, the submarine is not visible even in a forward position. Thus fire from a forward position at close quarters.

c) The submarine commander must acquire judgment, whether or not he can be seen at night, by the enemy. In general, the enemy's capacity to see submarines is overrated. So, keep you nerve, remain above water, evade ships above water, then perhaps turn a circle and proceed rearward. The situation will then be kept in hand. Once submerged, one would be stationary and blind and leave a change of the situation to the enemy.

3.) <u>During and after attack.</u>

a) Do not submerge without reason in daytime after contact with the enemy or attack. Never forget that submerging renders the boat passive and blind.

b) Also try to remain, as long as possible, at periscope depth. Only then, chance for a new attack, resp. the ascertaining of a hole to escape enemy pursuit offers itself. The "Eto" firing position will not be seen by the enemy in somewhat agitated sea, consequently, whenever possible remain at periscope depth even after firing, observe results and exploit new possibilities of attack .

c) Should it become necessary during attack on a convoy to submerge to a depth of 20 meters because of danger of being sighted or rammed, it is not necessary to abandon attack alltogether. Since the situation in the direction of the attack has become confused at a depth of 20 meters it could be expedient to turn at high speed abruptly to the far side and to proceed slightly diverging in the general direction of the enemy in order to newly attack from outside. In this way, on a long convoy, there is always opportunity to fire another shot at one of the last ships.

d) However, should it become necessary to submerge to depth 4 because a destroyer for example was proceeding directly toward the periscope, it is quite correct to crash dive at high speed and <u>to get away from the place.</u>

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Within 5 minutes one can be 1000 meters away and out of the danger zone. Get away from the place first and do not start listening. Do not flood the ship while crashdiving but scud it, since the ship at greater depth becomes heavier by itself. Submerge beyond 100 meters only if depth charges necessitate such action. When this desired horizontal and vertical distance from the danger point is achieved then after suspending the ship at necessary depth stop all engines, listen to the enemy's activity and act accordingly.

e) Do not rescue crew-members nor take them along and don't bother about boats of ships. Weather conditions and proximity of land are of no consequence. Concern yourself only with the safety of your own boat and try to achieve additional successes as soon as possible. We must be hard in this war. The enemy started it in order to destroy us, and we have to act accordingly.

signed Doenitz

H0656 – 0028

Filed May 9, 1946

Doenitz 11

Most Secret

Standing War Orders BdU
1942

Issued by the F.O. U-Boats (BdU)

Operational and tactical directives.

List of Contents

A.General

Order No.

101 Directives for the conduct of war against merchant shipping by submarines.

102-103 open

104 Special neutrality rules

105 Neutral ships and special orders for their treatment

106-120 open

B. Orders for the conduct of war.

121 Hospital Ships

122 Neutral ships in neutral convoy

123 Complementary orders for the conduct of war according to Prize-Regulations (Prisenordnung)

124 Rules of conduct in neutral territorial waters

125 Incidents and conduct in violation of international la

126 Conduct towards French war- and merchant-ships *)

127 Measures for Norwegian ships returning to port

128 Transport of gift packages for prisoners of war *)
Ships for the work of the Red Cross

129 Fishing in the Bay of Biscay

120-150 open

C.Other operational and tactical orders

151 British directives for convoys *)

152-170 open

171 Experiences and observations

172 Procedure in case of depth charge pursuit

173 Excerpts from directives of the British Admiralty *)

174 Enemy Anti-Submarine vessels

175 Procedure for outmanoeuvering depth charge attacks by location

176 General directives for the execution of an escort task by a U-Boat

*) voided later

H0656-0029

177 Use of U-Boat artillery against steamers at night. Sudden burst of fire. *)

178 Recent experiences concerning the combatting of convoys by Lt.Topp.

179 Submerging in case of depth charge pursuit. *)

180 Supplying from U-Boat tankers.

181 Procedure against enemy aircraft.

182 Procedure when taking up fighter protection or air escort

183 Sailing in groups of 2 to 3 boats
184-199 open

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D.

301-312 follow technical torpedo orders

313-330 open

350 Fixing the speed of enemy war- and merchant-ships by listening to number of revolutions of the propellers.

E.

401-410 open

411-500 Follow navigation- and barrage-orders

F.Duties and Instructions of the Commande

501 Keeping of the war diary

502 Announcements to the crews

503 Internal escort

504 Flooding in case of alarm

505 Keeping of submerging log

506 Attack depths

507 Test diving when on operation

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509 Reports of successes

510 Main Diesels on:ines at high power at sea

511 Taking on board officers of ships sunk

512 Conduct as prisoner of war

513 Bringing in of prisoners

514-550 open

*) voided later

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Rejected

Doenitz 12

Excerpt from the "Voelkischer Beobachter" of 28 October 1939, No. 301 Page 3

Words below a picture:

"On the oceans German U-boats conduct a relentless battle against the British blockade. Our picture which was mad on board of a neutral ship, shows a German U-boat searching a freight steamer. Between reeling and U-boat the German prize detachment can be seen.

Excerpt from the"Voelkischer Beobachter" of 1 December 1939, No. 335, Page 3

Words for several pictures:

"The German Navy fights gentlemanlike".

A passenger of the American steamer "American Farmer" who was present with a camera gives an eyewitness report of the gentlemanly conduct of the German U-boat commanders in the war against England. A German U-boat appeared suddenly on the high seas and requested the American to take on board the crew of the English steamer "Kafiristan", which was sunk by him. The commander of the German U-boat gave him the exact place of the sinking and helped him to find the life boats. At right: The U-boat contacts the American steamer.- Next at the right: and below: The crew of the sunken English steamer is taken on board.

Filed May 11, 1946

Doenitz 13

Excerpt

from the statement of Lieutenant Ernst-Ulrich Brueller

of 24 January 1946

.....

I was executive officer of the Commanders Training Flotilla from November 39 until March 40. In that position I was acquainted with all written orders and directives of the commanding officer. - Hereafter until the end of Nov.40 I participated as watch officer on U 4 in two operations against the enemy in the North Sea and in three on U 28 in the North Atlantic. With U 4 we destroyed by torpedo an enemy submarine at night at the Norwegian coast. On orders of the commander the locality where the sinking took place was searched with search lights for survivors but without results. The sinkings by U 28 were made from the midst of convoys whereby the saving of the crews by other convoy vessels was secured. I recall the sinking of two ships travelling separately. In the first case the ship sank after having been hit by torpedo. The crews of both life-boats were asked if they needed anything. They were well equipped with everything they needed. In addition they received from us cigarettes and some liquor and were sent on their way with directions of their course. In the second case the torpedoed ship had to be sunk with artillery. The artillery fire was directed expressly in such a way that the withdrawing life-boats were not endangered. The boats were later asked if they need assistance. The reply was no.

H0656 - 0031

H0656 – 0032

Extract

from the statement of Lieutenant j.G. Hunold von Ahlefeld of 25 January 1946

I, Hunold von Ahlefeld, Lieutenant j.G. in the 1st minesweeper division was born in Linz o.Rhine on 2 April 1923. As naval officer candidate I was assigned in October 1941 to U 455, commanding officer Naval Lieutenant Giessler, afterwards to U 94, commanding officer Lieutenant j.G. Otto Ites and participated in operations against the enemy on both boats. As I was commissioned with the handling of the Secret and Confidential Military Documents I was acquainted with all orders and rules, also with the operational orders of the U-boats. During that time I have never read nor heard of an order in which the destruction of life saving apparatus or of the crews of ships which had been sunk, had been mentioned. All operational orders contained the appendix which pointed out the importance of taking prisoners. U 94 itself brought a captain back to St. Nazaire from a trip in May-June 1942. On the same trip the boat drew fire when it tried to approach the life boats of the sinking steamer "Tolken" to take prisoners on board and to provision the life boats. This fire came from a machine gun on board the sinking steamer so that the boat for its own safety was forced to submerge.

.....

H0656 - 0033

Doenitz 13

EXCERPT

from the statement made by Naval Lt. (Kapitaenleutnant) Heinz-Konrad F e n n on 22 January 1946.

I, Lieutenant Heinz-Konrad Fenn (Navy), born on 20 July 1918 at Kiel-Holtenau, was detailed to the U-boat arm from 1 April 1940 to the end of the war without interruption. Up to August 1941, I was watch officer on the U 108 under the then Naval Licutenant, Klaus Scholz.

.....

I remember several occasions in 1941 when my commander at the time, gave instructions on the course to the nearest port to lifeboats of sunken vessels. In one case a lifeboat was even given provisions by us because we found that the lifeboat was insufficiently equipped. They were survivors of the steamer "Dirphis" sunk by us in June 1941. The crew received about 20 loaves of bread and fresh water. The attached photograph Nr. 1 shows the transfer of provisions to the lifeboat, photograph Nr. 2 shows the radio operator of the steamer who was taken aboard and refreshed by us because he was particularly weak. This boat also was released with instructions on the course to the nearest port.

H0656 - 0034

Dönitz 13

E X C E R P T

from the statement made by Lieutenant Commander(Korvettenkapitän Ulrich Heyse on 15 February 1946

I, Lieutenant Commander Ulrich Heyse, born 20 September 1906 in Berlin Friedenau, residing in Flensburg, was commander of a U-boat from March 1941 to March 1943.

.....

In the spring of 1942, I gave dry bread and rum to every boat with the shipwrecked from the Norvegian steamer "South Africa". In all possible cases I assisted survivors drifting alone or on floats to the lifeboats at the place of sinking as, for instance in the case of the survivors of the steamer "Polybius" and, because she was further from the coast, I gave exact position and instructions on the course to the nearest Allied port.

Of the survivors I was able to take aboard during the war, I recall the warm inscription by the captain of the San Francisco steamer "West Ira" in memory and with thanks for the rescue and the nice time he spent with me aboard ship; in addition, a postal card to me with best Christmas and New Year's greetings from an officer, taken prisoner and taken along, from the internment camp.

In case of another ship, sunk at the end of 1942 or the beginning of 1943 near the African west coast, we intentionally took aboard the captain and the chief engineer injured during the sinking, where they were first given medical attention and later, when handed over, they expressed their warmest gratitude for the surprisingly restful time aboard ship with me,- as was done in all other cases.

H0656 - 0035

Doenitz 13

A F F I D A V I T

of Lieutenant Commander(Korvettenkapitain) Walter

F l a c h s e n b e r g on 4 March 1946

I, Walter F l a c h s e n b e r g, born 26 October 1908 at Muenchen-Gladbach, released on 30 August 1945 as Lieutenant Commander to Westerland/Sylt,Stephanstr.2, from 14 December 194 to 1 July 1942, commander of U-boat "U 71", declare in lieu of oath:

During the operation from 14 June to 3 July 1941, "U 71" sighted on 22 June a lifeboat with three Norwegians about 300 miles southwest of Iceland nautical,which was provided by me with water and food.

Rear Admiral Doenitz, then Commander of U-boats, emphatically expressed approval of my conduct when I made my report on the incident. The Commander was of the opinion that it had been my duty to assist the boat in the manner reported after I had come close to it. The then Lieutenants Oehrn and Hessler were present when I made my report.

H0656 - 0036

Doenitz 13

E x c e r p t

from the statement of Wilhelm Schulz of 27 February 1945

.....

My personal data are as follows:

Name:	Wilhelm Schulz
Born:	10 March 1906 at Cologne/Rhine
Address:	Hamburg 36, 17 Alsterufer
Former position and time of service:	1939-1941 commander on U-boats 1941-1943 commander in chief of a U-flotilla

.....

At the end of March 1941 I sank the British steamer "Tweed" at about 13 o'clock noon, off Freetown. After the ship went down I found a lifeboat (Rettungskutter) fully occupied by members of the crew and a capsized boat drifting in the water. There were sharks in the water and a seriously wounded man besides five other members of the crew were on the capsized boat. Even though at that time there was already danger from the air off Freetown, I surfaced, had the capsized boat put upright, the wounded man was bandaged and splints were applied, the men were distributed in equal numbers in the two boats, drinking water and food supply was replenished, the position of the ship determined, the sails made clear, and everything done in order to enable both boats to cover the distance of 150 nautical miles to Freetown. The First officer of the Tweed, then expressed his gratitude for the assistance.

I relate this in detail because after my return from the trip I reported my action orally to the commander of the U-boat (BDU) and found his emphatic approval.

.....

H0656 - 0037

Doenitz 13

EXCERPT

from the statement by Lieutenant Commander (Korvettenkapitai Egon Frh.von Schlippenbach of 29 January 1946

I, Lieut.Com. Egon Frh. von Schlippenbach, born 10 October 1914 in Cologne/Rhine, now residing in Pelzerhaken near Neustadt/Holstein, was commander of a U-boat from November 1941 to December 1943.

.....

In the spring 1943 I found two pneumatic boats with 8 survivors, enemy pilots, south of the mouth of the Straits of Otranto. I pulled alongside, inquired if medical help was needed and after a negative reply, continued to my zone of operations. Had I been on my way back, I would have taken the men aboard without a moment's hesitation. But in this case they meant a heavy burden on the boat in the zone of operation. No shots were fired at the ship-wrecked and nothing else was done which could have damaged the means of rescue. On the contrary. At the risk of being located by the enemy I sent a radio message and reported the event shortly after the encounter.

After my return I made a report. My conduct was fully approved of by the F.O Mediterranean as well as by the C.C. Navy.

.....

H0656 – 0038

Doenitz 13

Extract

from the statement of Lt. senior gr.retired (Kapitaenleutnant a.D. Gustav-Adolf JANSSEN vom 17.2.1946.

Gustav Adolf JANSSEN born 9.4.1915 at Blankenese near Hamburg. Residing in Turnierstr. 7 Flensburg. Served in the submarines from 1.October 1938 till the end of the war.

The submarine war was from the beginning to the end fierce but fair!

I have personally witnessed the following separate cases, which are connected with the question concerned:

1) In November 1940 we sank from U 65 in the Seaarea of Freetown the British Steamer "Fabian". The crew was provided with water, food and a chart from us and was informed about the straight course to the coast.

2) In the same area we sank several days later the British Steamer "Kohinoor" and immediately after a Tanker. The only survivor of the "Kohinoor" Mr.Condon, the 1st officer, was taken on board and later transferred to a German tanker.

3) On Dec 6, 1942 I sank from U 103 about 200 nautical miles west of the Azores the British Motorship "Henry Stanley" of the Elder Dempster line. I gave the crew sufficient time to get into the boats and according to orders took Mr. Richard Jones the captain on board. He was as a prisoner my guest for 4 weeks.

4) In May 1943 I took over from a driving raft in the Western Gulf of Biscay two British seamen , belonging to the sunk steamer "Fort Concord", who had been at sea for several days already. 2 Indian men and a Japanese left on the raft because of lack of room received water and food and some clothes. (The men taken on board were: Mr. Huxley and Oxton).

The cases mentioned under 3 and 4 happened after the order: not to take measures for life-saving. I noted down both cases in the war diary and they were presented after reaching port to the commander in chief. No objections were made.

Fwd May 11, 1946

Doenitz 14

Extract

from

War Diary of the Commander in Chief of the Submarines 1941

(KTB BdU August 1941)

Aug. 26, 1941 .....U 206 reports, taken on board two officers and four non-commissioned officers of an English plane. Reports intensive air searching flying low.

Extract

from

War Diary of the submarine U 206

(KTB U 206 August 1941)

Aug. 26, 1941
1725 o'clock up to surface for reconnaissance.
1830 o'clock followed direction of a red star on portside, when closer recognized 2 brightyellow, round rubber boats with 4 and 2 men. The crew waves. Made a circle. It is an English plane crew.

1920 o'clock
AM 1395 Taken on board, made prisoners. Had I given them victuals and let them drift, they could easily have been taken up as the weather was fine by a hydroplane, there was much plane-traffic. On the other hand they could never have reached the coast, 240 nautical miles away by their own effort, they would have perished. The former I did not wish the latter I did not have the heart to admit, the more so as no serious military disadvantages were forcing me. The next day windvelocity was 6 - 7 and the swell up to 6 (Windstaerke 6 - 7, Seegang bis 6). In haste I took over the rubberboats too, so as to have a possibility of putting the crew into boats again in case we were obliged. But it is better that the English should go from the Submarine in to captivity: The crew consists of:

1. Winter-Taylor, Flying Officer 21 years of age, No. 42733
2. Grocott, Flying Officer 41 years of age, No. 26739
3. Martin, Sergeant, 21 years of age No. 993934
4. Miller, Sergeant-Observer 30 years of age No. NZ 401210
5. Kennedy, Sergeant 20 years of age No 630077
6. Skuse, Sergeant 22 years of age No. 748628

Attitude of BdU:

1.....
2.....
3. Taking on board of English aviators agreed to.
(Remark of the copyist: The crew was 15 days on board.)

H0656 – 0039

Filed May 11, 1946

Doenitz 15

E X T R A C T

from the

War-Diary of the Commander in Chief of the Submarines 1941

(KTB BdU October 1941)

21 Oct.41 About 0500 o'clock Sub(U) 123 sees convoy once more, is forced away, gets in touch again and sinks the English Transport "Aurania" (13984 Brt) out of the convoy. The boat makes one prisoner. The boats continue their march to the West.

E X T R A C T

from

War-Diary of Submarine U 123
(KTB U 123 of 23 Aug. - 22 Nov. 1941)

21 Oct. 41 ..... (Description of attack against convoy.)..

0600 o'clock..... Gave Radiotelegram (Ft)position, course and speed of convoy left over and back to where ship was sunk. There big oil spot. Some floating wreckage and a sinking lifeboat. One man in it. Taken over the shipwrecked. According to his statement: auxiliary cruiser "Aurania" (13984Brt) got one hit in forcastle and one in forward corner of turbine-room. Of the crew (250 men) a part rescued by destroyer. .....

Criticism of Commander in Chief of Submarines
of War-Diary of Submarines U 123
(KTB U 123 from 23 August to 22 Nov.1941

1. The sinking of the fast auxiliary cruiser belonging to convoy is a very pleasant success.

2. Concerning the convoy action 2/3 November it would have been more correct for U 123 to attack immediately as other boats were already in contact.

3. Otherwise the enterprise was well thought out and well executed.

/s/ Doenitz

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 Filed May 9, 1946

Doenitz 16

Extract from Annex
to War Diary of Commander in Chief of Submarines
(KTB., BDU July 1942)

Report of Commander in Chief of Submarines before the Fuehrer on 14 May 1942 in presence of supreme commander of navy.

.....

Therefore it is necessary, to improve the weapons of the submarine by all possible means, so that the submarine may resist. The most important development to that subject is the torpedo with rangepistol, which will increase precision of torpedos shot against destroyers and therefore will put the submarine in a better position with regard to defense, and will in the first place also hasten essentially the speed of sinking of torpedoed ships. That way we economize torpedoes and protect the submarine from the enemy defense, as it may leave the place of combat quicker. A rangepistol will also have the great advantage that the crew will not be able to rescue themselves on account of the quick sinking of the torpedoed ship. This greater loss of crews will no doubt cause difficulties for the assignment of crews for the great American Construction program

..... (signed) Doenitz

Filed May 9, 1946

Doenitz 17

A f f i d a v i t

of Admiral of the Fleet Erich R a e d e r .

I, Erich R a e d e r , make the following affirmation for submission to the International Military Tribunal in Nuernberg. I am aware that false statements, made in an affidavit, are a criminal offense.

On 14 May 1942 the F.O. Submarines, Admiral Doenitz, was ordered with me for a verbal report and consultation to Headquarters where Hitler wished to inform himself about submarine problems.

During the report Hitler asked Doenitz whether any action could be taken against the crews of torpedoed merchant ships to prevent them from returning home. Admiral Dönitz declined unequivocally any action against the survivors of the ship's crew. He explained that the enemy crews could only be fought by improving the weapons (torpedoes) and by completely destroying the ships in the first place by torpedo hits. I confirmed that any other action was out of the question.

Hitler was satisfied with this opinion and has never hereafter approached me with such a request.

After having seen here at the Military Tribunal the document about the conversation of Hitler with Ambassador Oshima on 3 January 1942, concerning destruction of ship-wrecked crews of merchant ships, I believe that Hitler, in the conference in May 1942, tried to give now the order

H0656 – 0042

H0656 - 0043

which he had mentioned to the Japanese Ambassador. He had never before spoken to me of this conversation or of the matter at all, very likely because he was sure of my declining such ideas.

Nuernberg, April 1946

Erich Raeder

H0656 - 0044

Filed May 9, 1946

Doenitz 18

Excerpt from:

War Diary of the F.O. U-boats 1942

(KTB BdU 1.9. - 15.9.1942.)

2.9.: U 256 in 4702 N 0507 W surprised and bombed by aircraft unfit for sailing and diving. Has to be towed in by M boats with fighter protection.

3.9.: Aircraft sights U-boat in BF 4448 and 4160.

4.9.: Aircraft sights U-boat in BF 4651

U 756 did not report since 1 Sept. to convoy, inspite of call, must be presumed lost.

5.9.: Aircraft sights U boat in AE 87

6.9.: Aircraft reports U boat in BF 4426

U 705 was expected in port on the evening of 5 Sept. Boat did not return to date. Signs that U 705 was lost through enemy aircraft, as British aircraft on 3 Sept. reported submarine in BF 4448 and on 4 Sept. in BF 4651 and certainly attacked it. Loss of the boat is to be assumed.

7.9.: British aircraft report submarines in BF 4568, BF 4610 and CO 1273. U 130 was bombed in CC 1233 by Boeing Bomber. Little damage.

8.9.: U 202 on trip through Biscay bombed by aircraft. 2 torpedoes fouled

British aircraft report submarines in BF 4567, 4568 and AE 7113

9.9.: U 507 encounters in FF 1161 possible U boat trap

British aircraft report submarine in BF 7391 and 4870

10.9.: U 513 reports in BB 63 strong air patrols

British aircraft report submarines in BE 9666, BF 71 and AE 4784

(At attack with depth charges probably 4 hits)

H0656 – 0045

11.9.: British aircraft report submarines in CG 8394 (attack with ..... depth charges).....

12.9.: Aircraft report submarines in AM 3151, AM 3532 AM 1962 U.162, F.O. Commander Wattenberg, a tested boat, did not report since 1 Sept. 1942, inspite of several calls. It operated last in the waters around Trinidad nd has probably been destroyed there by aircraft. No details. Loss of the boat is to be assumed.

13.9.: British aircraft report submarines in BF 7823, AL 2928, AF 7141 u.AF 7731 (depth charges) Attack likely in AL. Aircraft believes two hits.

14.9.: British aircraft has attacked submarine with depth charges in approximately AL 30.

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Filed May 9, 1946

Doenitz 19

Extract from

War Diary of Submarine U 507
(KTB U 507 September 1942)

The navigation- and at the same time artillery-officer of the "Laconia" with the name of Buckingham states:

"Laconia" had 8 guns (two 15 cm) Fla, Asdic, Depth charges.... When she was torpedoed there were nearly 3000 people on board, among them:

1800 Italian prisoners of war
160 Polish prisoners of war from Russia as guards
463 members of the crew
268 men on furlough (R.N., R.A., R.A.F.)
50 women and children

Of the 22 life boats with approximately 1500 people, as reported by Hartenstein at the location of sinking, 7 boats or about one third have been found with 163 Italians, 310 English, 20 Poles. Concluding from this about 1300 Italians perished at the sinking. According to statements of the English each of the two torpedoes hit one of the 8 prisoner holds. Apart from that the Italians, to a large extent, appeared not to have succeeded to get into the boats. At the fight for the life boats, according to the assertions of the Italians, a number of their people were shot (British Flying Lt. Head) or rendered harmless by blows on the head and hands (British army engineer Joung 2753798). Refrained from taking these two on board to be able to take as many Italians on board as possible.

The Italians stated furthermore, that they were mistreated several times by the Poles through bayonet stabs. The Italians looked rather starved. Had recently received only water and bread, according to the English as punishment for breaking into the post and freight rooms, also for violating the prohibition against smoking on the "Laconia". Clothing was very bad. Largely prisoners clothing. Many nearly or entirely naked.

H0656 - 0047

Filed May 9, 1946

Doenitz 20

Excerpt from War Diary (K T B) - U - 156, September 1942

12 Sept. 2107 Started for surface attack.

2207 Fans from tubes I and III with half cone of fire.
(Values follow)
1st hit amidships, 2nd hit heard but position not observed with certainty. Underestimated range considerably. According to this steamship must be much larger. Steamship stops. Lowers lifeboats. Down at the bow. Standing by to leeward (distance 2-3,000 meter) in order to await sinking. Steamship transmits; over 600 m.

2222 Sss sss o4 34 S 11 25 W

Laconia torpedoed.

2226 Steamship sends on 25 meter:
(Radio signals follow)

Laconia torpedoed.

Interfered with our own transmitter.
According to radio name steamship "Laconia" Cunard White Star Line Liverpool.
During a loop to windward heard Italian cries for help. Fished for people/ Italian prisoners of war from North Africa.
Ostensibly steamship has 1200-1800 of them aboard.

2323 Steamer has gone down (19695 BRT) (Registered tons)
Survivors are taken aboard. Shortly after sinking violent below surface detonations like those of exploding depth charges. According to shortwave observation a steamer close by: Her transmitter penetrates all bands at 25 meter.

Hartenstein

13 Sept. 0000 According to Italian accounts British closed bulkheads to prisoners' quarters and at the point of a gun prevented attempts by Italians to enter boats following the hit.

0125 Wireless message sent on America circuit:
Sunk by Hartenstein British ship Laconia Marqu. naval grid) FF 7721 310 degrees (Grad).
Unfortunately with 1,500 Italian prisoners of war. Up to now picked up 90,157 cbm, 19 torpedoes, wind 3, request orders.

0345 Wireless message received: Group Eisbaer, Schacht, Wuerdemann and Wilamowitz proceed immediately to Hartenstein Marqu. FF 7721
High speed. Schacht and Wuerdemann report position. Boat in zone of debris (Trummerfeld) full of Italians. Can help no longer; already have 193 aboard.

H0656 - 0048

13 Sept. 0345 That is utmost limit for prolonged diving. end. (Abgelaufen)

0400 Wireless message received for Hartenstein:

Report immediately: Did ship radio, are majority of shipwrecked in boats or drifting. Details on place of sinking.

0437 Wireless message sent on America circuit:

"Ship radioed exact position. Have aboard 193 men, among them 21 British. Hundreds of shipwrecked are drifting only with Mae Wests. Propose diplomatic neutralization of location of sinking. According to radio observation unknown steamer stood nearby.

von Hartenstein".

0450 Test diving.

0523 Surfaced, stopped.

0600 Wireless message over 25 meter sent twice:
(Transl. note: the following in English in the original.)
If any ship will assist the shipwrecked Laconia crew, I will not attack her, providing I am not be attacked by ship or air force. I picked up 193 men.
4 52 s 11 26 w

German submarine.

0610 Wireless message over 600 m sent again twice.

0720 Wireless message received: Hartenstein remain near place of sinking. Secure all clear for diving. Detailed boats to take over only as many as to remain clear for diving. Details as to neutralization follow.

0755 Wireless message received: Group Eisbaer, Schacht, Wuerdemann: Italian U-boat Cappellini also proceeding to place of sinking. Laconia from FE 10.

0930 31 British and Italians distributed to boats in order to unburden own boat. During entire day picked up survivors and distributed them into not yet overloaded life-boats.

1600 100 men distributed into boats. Continue fishing.

2100 Evening position: 5degree 08'S 11 degree 25'W
After dark stopped

2230 Wireless message received:
1) Hartenstein transfer all rescued to first boat arriving probably Wuerdemann. Then proceed to the Southward.

H0656 – 0049

13 Sept. 2230 2.) Boat that is taking over to wait for Schacht and Würdemann and Italians, distribute the rescued.

3.) Arranged to pass rescued on to French boat or harbour. Further news follows.

14 Sept. 0209 Radiogram on America circuit: Estimate about 1500 survivors in about 22 large boats full to the gunwales and in many small rafts. Von Hartenstein picked up about 400 200 distribut in boats. Up to now no steamers no air.

0245 Received radiogram. To Hartenstein, Würdemann, Schacht. For meeting French ships the followi sign of recognition (ES) agreed to: Star – sign of recognition: call red green. Letters sign recognition. Call QU, Answer DB. About arrival details as soon as known.

0740 Radiogram received:
1) Polar bear boats incl. Wilamowitz, which do not yet have rescued on board, immediately continue route South.
2) In case people taken on board, report number, besides when starting South report position by means of short signal.
3) All boats, also Hartenstein only take in as many people that boat when under water completely ready for use.
4) Hartenstein, Schacht, Würdemann immediatel in direction of Marqu. FF 4485, to hand over rescued.
5) Witte immediately report position by short signal.

15 Sept. 0340 Radiogram received: To Laconia group: Colonial-advise-boats "Dumont", "Durville" and "Anamite" will probably arrive 17 Sept. morning. Cruiser Gloire-class full speed under way from Dakar. Time of arrival as soon as known here.

1132 Meeting with U 506. 132 Italians transferred, kept 131.

1302 Transfer finished. Went to place of sinking.

1612 Picked up boat full of water occupied by Italians and English. Taken over the exhausted occupants.
Bailed out boat and towed.
Intention: Usage for further transfer. 2 more boats seen and approached.

H0656 – 0050

Doenitz 20

15 Sept.1943 Supplied occupants of both boats with water. Had boat in tow occupied by English and Italians and thrownoff.

2150 Picked up another occupied boat, taken in tow. Direction towards place of collection. Did not find boats in darkness. Stopped waiting.

Hartenstein.

16 Sept.0004 Radiogram sent on America II: von Hartenstein.

.....

2) Have transferred to Würdemann 132. Standing FE 9933. Collecting boats and staying close by 150 cm.

0255 Radiogram received Hartenstein, Würdemann, Schacht.

1) Stand FE 9695 to transfer to Frenchman on 17th in Marqu.

0800 In direction indicator (rw) 340 degrees seen the 3 collected boats. 4th boat towed to meeting place. Taken in tow also another boat that had drifted further away. On board about 55 Italians and 55 British among them 5 women.

1125 Shortly before reaching the other two boats from direction finder (rw) 70 4-motor airplane with American markings. To demonstrate my peaceful intentions showed Red Cross flag 2 x 2 m on bridge crosswise to direction of flight. Flies over once and circles close for a while. Morse communication: where from and whether seen steamer in proximity fails. Flies of to SW and comes again in ½ hour for short time.

1200 Etmal: U.W. 72 nautical miles

1232 Machine of same type flies close passes at 80 m hight short in front of bow. Throws two bombs with about 3 secs.delay. While aft towline with 4 boats being thrown off, plane throws bomb amidst boats. One boat capsizes. Airplane circles in proximity and after a while throws 4th bomb 2-3000 m away. Recognize bomb-bay empty.

H0656-0051

16 Sept 1232 flies over again 2 bombs, one explodes with 1 sec delay directly under central room tower disappeares in black waterbell . Central and bowroom report water entering . Ready at lifebelts. Order all British off board. Then when battery bilge starts to gasify: Italians also off board (have no underwater lifesavers (Tauchretter) for them).

1311 War distress report sent on 4 different waves 3 times each.
FFF 9697 FE uty. Went back to boats there transferred all off board (the last with mild force). Report concerning water coming in revoked. No leak. Wonder of German Ship-building.

1345 Dived. Leveled boat. Course 270 degrees put off.

1600 Damages repaired as far as possible. Unserviceable: air periscope fast, main periscope (Standsehrohr) cannot be wheeled. 7 battery cells run out, others uncertain, cooling water flange of Diesel cracked. Radar cracked sounding and listening apparatus not clear. Perfect and efficient work done by technical staff.

2142 Surfaced in darkness. With one diesel continued 2 x HHF course W. During night Radar occupied. No location.

2304 Radiogram sent: von Hartenstein. Bombed 5time by American liberator in low flight when towing 4 full boats in spite of Red Cross flag on bridge and good sight. Both periscopes at present out of order. Breaking off rescue, all off board, putting off to West. Will repair.

Hartenstein.

17 Sept 0145 Radiogram received. To Hartenstein. Do not participate anymore in rescueing action. Report as soon as can be overlooked, fuel, torpedoes, provisions, readiness for action.

.....

H0656-0052

Ited May 9

Doenitz 19

Excerpt from

War-diary of U Boat U 507
(KTB U 507 September 1942)

---

15 September 23:45 hours

outgoing radio telegram 21:20 hours/15

Qu. FF 7444. Still 20 cbm., 152 Italians, 2 English officers, 2 Women aboard. 86 Englishmen, 9 Poles in 4 tow boats. Steer course for search.

Schacht.

16 September 13:00 hours

incoming radio telegram 0952 hours/16

To Schacht

Swab boats occupied by English and Poles (obviously meaning: cast off boats - hitherto towed - with English and Poles. Note of translator).

.....

17 September 01:40 hours

incoming radio telegram 00:19 hours/17th.

To Laconia Group.

Safety of boat is not to be endangered under any circumstances. Take all measures ruthlessly, including discontinuance of rescue activities. Assumption, that enemy would spare U Boats is completely erroneous. Schacht and Wuerdemann to report position.

03:06 hours

outgoing radio telegram 01:58 hours/17th

Qu. F.E.K. 9627. 129 Italians, 1 English officer, 16 Children, 15 Women aboard. 7 boats with about 330 people, among them 35 Italians in the neighborhood. Question disembarkation or transfer.

Schacht.

03:30 hours

incoming radio telegram 01:51 hours/17th

To Schacht and Wuerdemann.

Boats must at all times be clear for crashdiving and under-water use.

H0656-0053

Rescued aboard ship to be transferred to life-boats. Keep only Italians aboard, proceed to meeting point Qu. FE 9695 and transfer to French. Beware enemy-activities, fliers and U-boats.

.....

18:00 hours

incoming radio telegram 16:14 hours/17th.

To Wuerdemann and Schacht.

Do not show Red-Cross-flag since its display is

1) not provided for internationally

2) in no case and least of all a guaranty of consideration with the English.

.....

23:10 hours

outgoing radio telegram 1930 hours/17th.

Transfered 163 Italians to Anamite. Navigation officer of Laconia and other English officer aboard ship. 7 life-boats with about 330 Englishmen and Poles, among them 15 women and 16 children deposited at Qu. FE 9612 Kept women and children aboard ship for one night. Supplied all shipwrecked with hot meal and drinks, clothed and bandaged as far as necessary. Sighted 4 more boats at sea anchor Qu. FE 9619. Transmitted both positions to Cloire, which at once proceeded for search. Still 28 cbm. 20 days rations, 9 eels (torpedoes), fully ready for action.

Schacht

18 September 01:30 hours

incoming radio telegram 00:08 hours/18th.

1) Schacht and Wuerdemann put off to the north.

2) No stories with unnecessary details.

20 September 13:20 hours

incoming radio telegram 11:70 hours/20th.

To Schacht

Action according to wireless of 17 September was wrong. Boat was dispatched to rescue Italian Allies not for rescue and care of Englishmen and Poles.

H0656-0054

Filed May 9, 1946

Doenitz 21

War-diary U 506

15 September .....

23:24 hours outgoing wireless (2102/239):

Position Mar. Qu. FF 7477. 130 Italians from Hartenstein aboard ship. In tow 4 life-boats with about 250 people. 55 cbm.

.....

17 September

02:55 hours outgoing wireless (0151/263):

Position at Qu. 9690 with 4 life-boats. On board 142 Italians, also 9 women and children. No aircraft sighted.

.....

12:22 hours Crash-dive because of aircraft (heavy seaplane) 3 bombs at A - 20 m. No damage.

13:40 hours surfaced.

.....

19:00 After "U-507" shipwrecked transferred to "Annamite".

20:30 hours

.....

23:43 hours outgoing wireless (2303/271):

Mission on "Annamite" completed. 53 cbm. 5 weeks. 5 - 2 eels (torpedos). Attacked by heavy sea plane at noon. Fully ready for action. Position FE 9680.

.....

Filed May 9, 1946 E.

H0656-0055

Doenitz 22

Extract from

War-diary of Commander of U-Boats 1942
(KTB BdU September 1942)

---

12 September:

.....

e) 1. At 0110 hours, at position FF 7721 U 156 sinks the Briton "Laconia" (19.695tons). Course 310°, After torpedoing boat ascertained that ship carried 1500 Italian prisoners of war. Group "Eisbaer" including U 459, U50 and U 507 are ordered to proceed full speed to the point of torpedoing, An Italian boat in the neighborhood is also deployed. It is intended to proceed first, to "Bingerville" (French Ebony Coast) with the shipwrecked. Meantime U 156 took 193 persons aboard, among them 21 Britons. Further orders will follow.

.....

13 September :

d) U 156 is ordered to remain at the sinking point. U 506 and U 507 proceed full speed to this point to take shipwrecked aboard. Fast French boats proceed from Dakar, resp. Bingerville to point of torpedoing, to receive shipwrecked from U-boats and to pick up any survivors still in lifeboats. Remaining boats of Group "Eisbaer" proceed on southward route.

.....

15 September :

3) U 382 is spotted by aircraft in AF and bombed . Return trip to Bergen necessary for repairs.

H0656-0056

Doenitz 22

U 506 and U 507 have taken over ship-wrecked from U 156 and also tow lifeboats. Among them some Englishmen and Poles. Boats receive orders to let life rafts carrying Englishmen and Poles drift. After checking ship's reckoning, the sinking point of the "Laconia" is established at FF 7752. New rendez-vous with French ships on 17 September at FE 9695.

.....

H0656-0057

Tabled May 9, 1946

Doenitz 23

EXTRACT

from

War Diary of Naval War Command 1942

(KTB Skl Part A June 1942)

June 5, 1942 According to instructions received from naval war command, submarines receive the order from F.O. U-Boats to take on board captains with their papers of ships sunk, if it is possible without endangering the boat or without impairing the fighting capacity.

Filed May 11

Top secret.

Copy No. 907
20 May 1943

Standing Order of F.O.U. No 511

Taking on board officers of ships sunk.

1. As far as conditions of accommodation allow on board, Captains and Chief Engineers of sunk ships are to be brought in. The enemy tries to contravene this intention and has issued the following orders:

   a) Captains are not allowed to make themselves known if questioned, but should if possible put forward other sailors, selected especially for this purpose.

   b) Crew has to state that Captains and Chief Engineers remained on board. If in spite of energetic questioning it is not possible to find out the Captains or the Chief Engineers, then other ship's officers should be taken aboard.

2. No taking on board is allowed of Captains and officers of neutral ships which, according to Standing Order No. 101, may be sunk (e.g., Swedish ships outside Goeteborg traffic), because internment of these officers would contravene international law.

For F. O. U-Boats

Chief of Operations Division
signed Godt

Cover leaf.

3. If ships officers cannot be taken prisoner, other white members of the crew should be taken on board as far as accommodation facilities and further tasks of the boat permit. The purpose is interrogation of prisoners for military and propaganda purpose.

4. In the case of sinking a destroyer, corvette, or patrol vessel sailing alone, try under all circumstances to take prisoners, if that can be done without endangering the boat. Interrogation at interrogation camp can produce valuable indications as to the enemy's submarine procedure, gear and weapons and the same applies to crews of planes shot down. Beware of airplane wrecks. (vide standing order No. 12).

H0656-0058

Found May 11

Doenitz 25

Copy No.007
1st June 1944

Top Secret!

Standing order of the F.O.U.Boats No.513

Bringing in of prisoners.

1) Statements of prisoners are the surest and best sources of information about enemy tactics, weapons, location gear, and procedure. Prisoners from planes and destroyers can be of the utmost value to us. Therefore, every effort must be made to bring in such prisoners, as far as possible without endangering the boat.

2) As prisoners are especially ready to make statements under the effect of being captured they should be interrogated immediately on board. Of primary interest is, how submarines are detected by airplanes, whether by radar or by passive location activity e.g. by detecting electrical or heat rays from the boats. Report prisoners made as soon as possible so that they can be transferred to boats returning to base.

F.O.U.Boats
chief of Ops.Div.
signed Godt.

H0656-0059

H0656-0060

EXTRACT
from
War Diary of Submarine U 105

(KTB 105 from 29 Oct 42 to 14 Feb. 43

27 Jan 43 .....

1010 o'clock Steamer sunk over back

Description: Clipper bow, fore castle with gun.....

.....

Much wreckage flooting about where sunk, boxes, big rafts, gasoline barrels. Two large fully occupied life boats; approached in order to capture captain. He is not in the first. Learned that the steamer is the American motorship "Cape Decision" bound for Africa from Charleston loaded with gasoline, provisions and machine parts. Port of destination there not known. 8000 reg. tons, life boats look brand new and seem to be very well equipped; this is a new war construction. To judge from a name label fished up later which also looks quite new ship is on maiden trip. Captain supposed to be in the other boat. Approached that one, the same statements, but captain allegedly not aboard. Took an older Seaman aboard, who is to point out the captain in other boat. Again went back to other boat but captain cannot be found. I believe, that in fact he was not in the boats.....

H0656-0061

Extract

from statement of Lieutenant Commander Georg Lassen
from 14 February 1946

I, Lieutenant Commander (retired) Georg Lassen, born 12 May 1915 in Berlin, residing at Flensburg, was watch keeping officer on U29 from 18 August 1939 till 3 January 1940 and subsequently till 1 October 1941 commander of the same boat. From 16 October 1941 till 18 May 1943 I was commander of U160

.....

On my second action as commander I took up shipwrecked persons twice in the area around Trinidad. At one time it was the Captain of the English steamer "Treminard" and later it was the captain and the radio operator of the Norwegian tanker "Havsten". The latter two I pulled out of the water shortly before they would have drowned. Thereafter I was discovered by the enemy defense and bombed by a plane on the same day. Later on I did not occupy myself in rescue measures.

.....

Field Mar 11

Doenitz 26

Affidavit

of Lieutenant Commander (retired) Hans Witt

Kiel 5 February 1946

Present:

Fleet judge Dr. Schattenberg
(female) employee Jabs

Before the undersigned judge appears the former Lieutenant Commander Hans Witt. He was instructed about the significance of an affidavit.

He stated: I was born in Bautzen in Saxony on 25 December 1909. On 1 April 1929 I joined the navy. From July 1943 until September 1944 I was in the staff of the Commander in Chief of the Submarines as a department chief for the utilization of war experience of the Submarines and enemy defense against submarines.

I now reside at Flensburg-Mürwik Falklandstrasse 25. I did not belong neither to the NSDAP nor to any of its affiliated groups.

In November 1943 in the course of my official duty in the staff of the Commander in Chief of the submarines, I had to interview naval lieutenant Albrecht, commander of the submarine U386, concerning his experiences during his action just terminated. Albrecht reported that at the height of Cape Finisterre he had seen by day a rubber boat with shipwrecked British aviators in the Gulf of Biscay. He did not take rescue measures because he was on the way to a convoy in process of being formed He could only have reached his position by continuing without a stop. Besides he was afraid that the prisoners would have been a hindrance in the convoy combat that was to be expected.

I then explained to him that the saving of the shipwrecked, taking into consideration the statements to be expected, would have been more important than his participation in the convoy combat.

I further told him, that at the time we had so few statements of taken enemy crews of submarine-chaser planes, that it would have been more important to have picked up the aviators, than to have gone to the convoy.

These reproaches corresponded to the fundamental attitude of the grand admiral, that I have repeatedly gathered from official conversations and was also expressed by the Chief of operations Rear-admiral Godt.

H0656-0062

H0656-0063

I do not know if Albrecht really had the opportunity of reporting to the grand admiral. Had the grand admiral reproached the commander for not having killed the aviators, I would certainly have heard about it, because such an attitude would have contrasted from the otherwise ruling principles in such way, that I as a department chief and member of the staff would have been notified.

I solemnly declare in lieu of oath that the above statements are correct.

signed: Hans Witt

closed:

signed: Dr. Schattenberg
Navyjudge

Filed May 11, 1946

Doenitz 27

E x t r a c t

from

War-diary "U 386" September 1943

2 Sept. 43 .....

20:15 o'clock Surfaced for charging.

20:23 o'clock Sighted a rubberboat with 7 occupants. Heaved to. English plane crew. As boat is on trip out no prisoners taken on account of danger from air.

4 Sept. 43

00:40 o'clock Incoming Radio Telegram 0926/3/36: Contains order to surface only at night and only for charging. Charging on the way again at night.

.....

Criticism of the Commander of the Submarines on the War diary KTB "U 386" (Albrecht) from 12 May to 8 Oct. 43

.....

The dicision on 2 Sept. not to bring in the English drifting in the rubberboat was not correct. The information concerning enemy submarine defense is so scarce, that every opportunity to bring in prisoners must be exploited. Transfer to boats returning to base would have been possible.

For the Commander of Submarines

Chief of Operations Division

signed Godt

H0656-0064

Fld May 11, 1946

Doenitz 28

Extract

from

War-diary of the Commander of Submarines

(KTB BdU 1-15 Feb. 42)

15 Feb. 42 d) In order to search for the shipwrecked crew of FW 200 crash landed in BE 6789 on 13 Feb., the submarines on outward journey, U 94/507/508 are deployed. U 507 finds rubberboat with crew of 5 takes them on board. Boat continues outward journey. Intention to transfer to boat returning to base.

.....

IV. Generalities.

As gratifying as the rescue of two plane crews by submarines in the last days may be, nevertheless, though such aid seems at first sight only natural the decision remains always difficult, whether boats on outward journey should be used for such searches of shipwrecked plane crews. In the present situation the boats need every drop of fuel, so as to have sufficient freedom of action in distant areas of operation. Therefore the case may very well arise that a demand for help must be refused in view of the operations.

H0656-0065

Filed May 11, 1946

Doenitz 29

German Mine Sweeping-Service Headquarters
Schleswig-Holstein
(D.M./R.K.S.H.)
Chief judge

Kiel, 15 Feb.1946

Present:
Naval judge Dr. Schattenberg
Employee Jobs.

Before the judge appears the former Naval Lieutenant (senior grade) Hans Fuhrmann. The significance of a statement under oath was explained to him.

He stated: I was born in Swinemuende on 2[illegible] August 1916. I joined the Navy on 3[illegible] April 1935. From August 1940 till January 1943 I was adjutant to the Commander of Submarines, Admiral Doenitz.

At present I am living in Kiel, Nottelbeckstr. 14. I always accompanied Admiral Doenitz on his trips and was present at all the speeches he gave to Submarine Officers. I was also present when the speech was made to the trainees of the submarine instructional division in Gotenhafen at the end of September / beginning of October 1942. I do not remember details of this speech or of the discussion that followed. I have heard too many speeches of this kind. I know very well, however, the line of thought Admiral Doenitz followed in those days and which he kept repeating with regard to the question of total naval warfare. They were the following:

There are two bottlenecks which the enemy has to overcome, that of ships and that of crews. So as to increase these difficulties as many ships as possible should be sunk. Furthermore, captains and chief-engineers should be taken on board from the life-boat and brought back if possible, to prevent their further service.

Concerning measures for rescuing he used to say in those days: It was not justifiable for submarines, in view of the present aims of our naval warfare to expose themselves to the greatest dangers in order to save enemy crews. Thereby the safety of their own boats was risked. An overcharged boat was difficult to manoeuvre from the purely technical point of view. Besides, the presence of enemy crews meant an additional danger of sabotage. Both circumstances would diminish the safety of the boat to such an extent, that it would not be possible to carry out further attacks.

H0656-0066

H0656-0067

I never heard a remark to the effect that submarines should attack shipwrecked. Such a statement from Admiral Doenitz himself or from his chief of staff was quite unthinkable as far as my knowledge of the subject goes. Taking part in June 1942 in an operation of submarine U 106 under the command of Lieutenant Rasch, I myself took on board an Englishman, William by name, who was drifting in a life-boat, a boatswain from Liverpool on board and brought him to Lorient. As we were on our way back and the boat was not likely to go into action the rescueing was for us a matter of course. (Name and rank of the Englishman rescued are not quite certain, but it should be possible to ascertain them from the war-diary).

Following the speeches, made by Admiral Doenitz an informal gathering used to follow in the mess-hall. On these occasions I used to gather especially from younger officers which of the statements made by the Admiral had made a special impression or what subject left any doubts. As far as I can remember I was never asked, whether combat against the crew meant at the same time the annihilation of shipwrecked. I myself never got that idea.

I declare in lieu of oath that my statement made above is correct.

signed Hans Fuhrmann

closed

signed Dr. Schattenberg, Navy judge

H0656-0068

Doenitz 29

Naval Lieutenant
Herman Friedrich K r e s s

K i e l, Hildebrandstr. 5

Kiel 22 January 19

To:

Defense Counsel of Grand-Admiral Doenitz

N u e r n b e r g

International Tribunal

I, Naval Lieutenant Herman Friedrich Kress, born 1 July 1922 at Stolberg/ Rhld. was assigned to the submarine service without interruption from 1 February 1942 to the end of the war.

From 1 April 1944 to 8 June 1944 I was assigned to train U-Boats officers, after that I was assistant to the adviser on U-boat questions at the Navy High Command of the Baltic Sea. I remained in this postion till the end of the war.

On account of this position I was always informed about all oral and written orders for U-boats. I have never read or heard of any instructions which ordered the annihilation of survivors of sunk vessels. I only know of an order given repeatedly that life saving's measures shall only be carried out, if they can be carried out without endangering the own boat. I also have heard the speech made by Grand Admiral Doenitz before U-boat recruits in September 1942, which was mentioned by the witness Peter Hosef H e i s i g. Grand Admiral Doenitz said, that the fight of the U-boats can only be conducted with extreme hardness to bring about the desire success. Neither literal nor by intimation did he order the annihilation of survivors. When he spoke of hardness in conducting the fight, he did not mean hardness against the enemy but hardness against ourselves in physical and psychological respects. With the exception of the witness Heisig, nobody else would have understood it otherwise.

I remember the order issued in 1943 that U-boats should try to rescue captains and leading engineers of steamers sunk, in order to prevent them to be employed again on ther ships. This order would have been absurd, if there had existed instructions about the annihilation of survivors, since by the latter the desired aim would have been reached without burdening the U-boats with prisoners.

H0656-0069

Doenitz 29

In the course of my service with the Navy High Command of the Baltic Sea, the U-boats, used in the Gulf of Finland, had to be instructed repeatedly by order of F.O. to strive for the rescue of survivors of sunk vessels, if this did not endanger their own boats.

That this order was received can be confirmed by the former Navy Lieutenant Panke, who lives at Husum now and who was Commander of U-boat 242 assigned to the eastern part of the Baltic Sea.

I am ready at any time to confirm under oath the above statement which I consider to be an official report.

(signed) Herman Friedrich Kross

H0656-0070

-58- This page rejected

Doenitz 29

Navy Lieutenant
Hermann Friedrich K r e s s
K i e l, Hildebrandstrasse 5

Kiel, 22 January 46

To: Defense Counsel of Grand-Admiral Doenitz

N u e r n b e r g

International Tribunal

Hoping that use can be made of this, I want to make a few personal remarks about the witness for the prosecution Peter Josef Heisig, with whom I am well acquainted from our mutual trips on U 977.

H. who was assigned as first watch keeping officer was judged so unfavorably by the commander, the former Navy Lieutenant Hans Jakob Leilich, that during his furlough he did not let him take his place as it was customary, but ordered me to do so.

During several critical situations, as the result of collisions above or below water H. proved to be an absolute coward. He forgot completely his responsibility and duty as watch keeping officer and thought only about saving his own life.

In the circle of his comrades he was in no way popular because he kept always to himself, and on account of his frequent poor comradeship and his occasional bragging. Characteristic for his bragging is the fact that in the fall of 1943 he had to report to the chief of the 21st U-boat group, the former Lieutenant Commander Schuhart, because he dramatically represented, in a letter that was examined by the censor, a harmless under water collision as an incident in which the crew escaped certain death only by a miracle.

(signed) Hermann Friedrich Kress

H0656-0071

Navy Lieutenant Hans Steinhoff
Kiel-Kronshagen
D.M./R.K.S.H.

Declaration

I, Lieutenant (j.g.) Hans Steinhoff, born 18 July 1922 at Algermissen, Hildesheim County, declare herewith that from January 1942 to June 1942 I attended the courses of U.L.D. torpedo and signal school together with Lieutenant (j.g.) Heisig. During these courses we never received order or oral instructions from the lecturers or Grand Admiral Dönitz who visited and spoke frequently to the young U-boat officers, which had anything to do with the destruction of life-saving apparatus of sunk ships or with the annihilation of the shipwrecked . Also in several addresses given by the Grand Admiral, to which I listened after my training period, he never mentioned any thoughts or gave any instructions according to which the shipwrecked should be annihilated on their life-saving apparatus destroyed. I have only heard that life-saving attempts should only be under-taken if it did not strongly endanger the safety of your own boat.

As far as the person of Navy Lieutenant Heisig is concerned, I state that he was little esteemed and recogni by his comrades, since he was known as an officer who talk a lot but who is not ready to do his duty.

signed Hans Steinhoff

 Filed May 11, 1946

Excerpt from

War-diary of Naval War Command 1942
(KTB. SKL, part C, volume IV, pages 237-248)

Notes on Conference with the Fuehrer
in the Reichs-Chancellery on Monday,
28 September 1942
Time: 16^{30} to 18^{30} hours

Participants: The Fuehrer
Grandadmiral Dr. h.c. Raeder
Fieldmarshal Keitel
Admiral Doenitz
Admiral Fuchs
Vice-Admiral Kranke
Vice-Admiral Maertens
Conteradmiral Lange
Naval Captain von Puttkamer
Baurat Waas

The Fuehrer opens the conference with the remark, that he would like to be informed on the current situation of the U-boat warfare and get information on how far current developments were keeping step with further requirements of the war.

Continuing he expresses his admiration for the achievements of U-boats and his conviction that the number of sinkings would, in the future, remain high enough so that the enemy could not catch up with it through rebuilding. He reiterates his thoughts about acceleration of rebuilding on the enemy's side and remarks, that he could not possibly believe in such an increase of capacity of the enemy's ship-building-yards, as was generally spoken of in propaganda moves. Even if it were possible for the enemy, to launch the hulk of ships comparatively fast, he would lack machinery, auxiliary machinery, further items of gear and most of all personnel for the manning of these ships.

With respect to the problem of manning ships he points out, how disadvantageous it is, when large components of crews of sunken ships are again and again in position to carry on, on newly built ships.

H0656-0072

H0656-0073

The Fuehrer then speaks of the necessity, to turn in time to practical use new technical developments.

Admiral Doenitz gives an over-all picture on the current stand of the battle of the Atlantic.

The main difficulty for U-boats today lies in the threat by aircraft.

Admiral Doenitz shows on the map, to what range from the British Isles enemy planes had penetrated in 1940, 41, 42 and in which parts of the sea a strong combatting of convoys by U-boats consequently had to cease.

The Naval Chief (Ob.d.M.) points out, that we also had achieved considerable improvements with regard to the range pistol, and that its introduction at the front can be counted on within the forseeable future. This pistol will increase the destructive power of the torpedo to a backbreaking degree thus increasing the loss of lives considerably.

Ctrl may 11

D 663-GB 200-

High Command of the Navy
2.Skl/B.D.U.Op.
B.Nr. Gkdos. 6420

7 October 1943
Copy No.57

Top Secret!

Operation Order "Atlantic" No.56 for U-boats in the Atlantic.

I. Task: .....

II. Reports on Enemy, Stand 15 September 43

.....

5.) Enemy Merchant-shipping .

A. Convoys: .....

B. Securing of Convoys:

a) Protection at sea.

Convoys proceeding from America to England and vice versa are all way through protected by escort vessels (destroyers, escort destroyers, gun boats, frigates and corvettes) by the following procedure:

.....

b) Rescue-ships.

To each convoy a so-called rescue-ship is generally attached, a special vessel up to 3000 tons and which is designated to take aboard shipwrecked after U-boat attacks. These ships are in most cases equipped with a catapult plane and large motor boats, heavily armed with depth charge throwers and very manoeuverable and they are often taken for U-boat -traps by commanders. In view of the fact that annihilation of ship-crews is desired, their sinking is of great importance.

c) Protection by air:

.....

H0656-0074

Cdrd May 11, 1946

Extract from: Document D 642 - GB 196-

Appendix to BdU - Op- G. 1782 A 1,2 May 1940

Copy No. 18

S e c r e t !

Standing War Order of the F.O.U. No. 173

Extracts of directives of the British Admiralty.

1.) U-boat traps in Convoys

U-boat traps should be made use of whenever possible also in convoys.

They are to be committed among the last ships of a convoy and from their position to attract attacking U-boats by pretending a breakdown of the engine in order, to distract their attention from the convoy and thus finally be able to attack them themselves.

H0656-0076

 Rejected

Doenitz 31

Extract from:

Appendix 1[illegible] to

War Diary of the Naval War Command 1942

(KTB SK 1, Part C, Vol. VIII)

Berlin, 9 April 1942 B. No 1 Skl. 8313/42, g. Kdo.

Teletype message to Fuehrer Headquarters

for Captain von Puttkamer

In reply to telephone inquiry of 8 April

.....

British air attack on 6 July 1940 on German sea rescue airplane northwest of Stavanger. Succeeded in landing in spite of 8 hits. British air attack on sea rescue plane on 11 July 1940, 30 nautical miles southsoutheast of Portland, which subsequently had to land and was attacked once more in the water. Crew could save themselves in rubberboat.

British air attack on 20 July 1940 on sea rescue plane over channel. No damage.

British air attack on 27 July 1940 on sea rescue plane over channel. The sea rescue plane was shot down, the crew, except one man, is missing.

British air attack on sea rescue plane 10 km off Boulogne on 28 July. The air rescue plane was shot down, 2 men are missing.

On same day British air attack on another air rescue plane which had to break off the attempted rescue. Two members of crew injured; plane damaged by hits.

H0656-0077

Rejected

Doenitz 32

Extract

from

Documents of German Politics, Volume 8, Part I

40. Official German announcement of the German Memorandum to several neutral states regarding the proclamation of the total blockade against England, dated 17 August 1940.

Page 283

....

..... So, a few days ago, Mr. Churchill had an announcement made that the German unarmed sea rescue planes, which are under the protection of the Red Cross, and which rescue German or enemy fliers in distress would henceforth be shot down by England. (1)

.....

Page 284:
Foot note (1)

At the end of August, the German Reich Government in its Memorandum of the end of August, forwarded by the Swiss Government to the British Government, protested strongly against these British violations of international law, of which she cites eight different cases in July 1940 alone: a.o. two British fighters on 27 July (as also reported in the German War Communiquee of the 28 th) in the channel shot down a sea rescue plane, marked with the RED Cross, which wanted to rescue a crashed fighter. - On this occasion 4 men of the crew lost their lives, - on the 28th a sea rescue plane was shot down off Boulogne by 2 British fighter planes, (3 men of the crew were rescued, 2 are missing).